












On 2 September 2015, an image shook the world: with his head down facing on one side and                                   
his bottom slightly up ­­ the way toddlers often sleep ­­ Alan Kurdi, a 3­year old, in a red                                     
shirt and blue shorts, was lying dead on the Turkish shore. Kurdi and his family were Syrian                                 
refugees fleeing to Europe on a boat that capsized in the Mediterranean Sea. Kurdi drowned                             
with 11 other people and was washed ashore. ​Turkish ​journalist ​Nilüfer Demir captured the                           
iconic image ­­ Kurdi’s lifeless body being approached by an official on the Turkish coast ­­                               
soon to make global headlines. It immediately went viral on the social media, on Twitter with                               
the evocative hashtag #KıyıyaVuranİnsanlık, in Turkish meaning: Flotsam of Humanity. 
In this paper, I am concerned not so much with the phenomenon that the image represents as                                 
with the ‘capacity’ of image to represent, and with the curious association between this                           
‘capacity’ to represent and the phenomenon it represents. What is it in ​an image that has the                                 
capacity to shame entire humanity, heterogenous as it is? To further complicate, how does a                             
digital image ­­ a conglomeration of pixilated dots, devoid of any materiality whatsoever ­­ in                             
its singularity generate ‘affect’, universalizable and synchronic across cultures? A closer look                       
at the network analysis of the distribution and circulation of Kurdi’s image, or a simple                             
search with ‘Alan Kurdi’ on Google Trends will clearly reveal the extent of virality the image                               
gained in and for a very short span of time . This characterizes what Bill Wasik (2009) calls                                 1
‘nanostory’.  
We allow ourselves to believe that a narrative is larger than itself, that it holds some portent                                 




bear the weight of what we have heaped upon it, dies almost as suddenly as it emerged                                 
(Wasik, 2009: 3). 
How do the rise and fall of certain images ­­ the implications of ‘nanostories’, indeed so                               
tellingly in the case of Kurdi’s image ­­ then manage to leave behind a ‘trace’: a trace so                                   
evocative that it changes our perception of the represented phenomenon? How does the                         






Kurdi’s image depicts a tragic death. At most, it is indicative of the condition of precarity in                                 
which the migrants have to live. How does it then, when floated on social media, render                               
visibility to the underlying discourse of Europe’s refugee crisis in an expressive, but insistent                           
way? In fact, the image had changed our disposition towards ‘migration’ as an ontological                           
category. Our conversation on ‘migration’, following the circulation of this image,                     
surprisingly converged on ‘refugees’, which has been attested to by Google Trends . In this                           3
context, think of the images of: the Afghan girl on the cover of National Geographic; the                               
student in front of the tank at Tiananmen Square; ​or ​the agonized face of the man, with                                 
folded hands and teary eyes, taken during the 2002 Gujarat riots in India.   
2 ‘Bring(ing) forth’ is a phrase that been appropriated from Heidegger. In this paper, I play on the phrase in the                                         
context of Kurdi’s image. This phrase recurs in his writings on technology (Heidegger, 1977). In original                               






Notwithstanding the emotions and ‘affects’ they arouse, these images have struck us and                         
stuck with us because of their (re)construction of the ‘event’ that has been photographed.                           
Here, I use ‘event’ in a Deleuzian (1993: 78) sense:  
[T]he event is inseparably the objectification of one prehension and the subjectification of                         
another; it is at once public and private, potential and real, participating in the becoming of                               
another event and the subject of its own becoming. 
It is the quality of ‘becoming’ that distinguishes these images. In the case of Kurdi’s image,                               
this ‘becoming’ is actualized when it unfolds, rather ​un­conceals​ a whole new discourse on                           
refugee crisis. The iconicity of this image cannot be explained by ​the notion of the ‘decisive                               
moment’, to borrow Henri Cartier­Bresson’s oft­quoted phrase . ​On the other hand, take the                         4
example of the image of ​the American sailor kissing a woman in white dress on victory over                                 
Japan (V­J Day) in Times Square at New York City. This image is no less iconic. The kiss                                   
had understandably lasted only for a while. The capturing of the fleeting moment from within                             
the totality of time ­­ that ​‘decisive moment’ ­­ leaves us ​in awe of the photographic marvel.  
In contrast, think of Kurdi’s image. Kurdi’s body must have been at the shore for hours                               
before it was removed. In fact, there are several versions of the image that went viral. The                                 
expression that the Afghan girl or the Gujarati man is wearing in the photographs does not                               
seem to momentary either . Or better still, in the case of the image of the tank­man at                                 5
Tiananmen Square, photographer Jeff Widener, as we all know, had captured similar versions                         
of the same image. More to it, the incident had been filmed and received global attention                               
even in the pre­digital era. In that case, what ​explanatory apparatus other than the ‘decisive                             
moment’ do we need to invoke to make sense of the iconicity of these images?  
Taking off from here, we must ​engage with the question of ‘temporality’, indeed of the                             
interiority of time in these images. I am particularly concerned with Kurdi’s image, using                           
which as a case study I insist that the iconic photographs (as texts) that unfold around the                                 
subject of migration can paradoxically be read more as a commentary on time than                           
movement. I want to explore one disposition central to these photographs – temporality – as                             
they graphically represent the experiences of (im)migration, exile and so on. What I seek to                             
understand is how photographs, in their graphical recounting of the spaces of (im)mobilty,                         
forge relationships with migration as a phenomenon. Since its inception, photography as a                         
medium, though ​still​ , has played a crucial role in depicting movement: of people, objects,                           
identities, ideas etc. The documentary and the evidentiary nature of photography have                       
understandably contributed to this. However, the point is to ask: how do the photographs                           
themselves move beyond regional­national­cultural paradigms in order to convey the                   
4 ​‘Decisive moment’ is a phrase coined by Cartier­Bresson (1999: 16) to denote, in the context photography,                                 
‘the simultaneous recognition, in a fraction of a second, of the significance of an event as well as of a precise                                         
organization of forms which give that event its proper expression’. 
 
5 ​Steve McCurry photographed the Afghan girl. However, upon critical examination, many of McCurry’s                           




‘essence’ of migration in photographic terms ? How do these photographs compel us to                         6
rethink the ‘inner’ coherence of an universal photographic language, if any, and (re)examine                         
more minutely what it yields with respect to the (re)contextualization of the represented? 
 
At this point, I want to stress on the problematic status of the ‘object’ of Kurdi’s photograph .                                 7
The image does not limit itself to documenting the ‘conditions of existence’ of the migrant.                             
While bringing forth larger ‘truth’ about migration, it rather provokes a further thought on the                             
status of the ‘object’ of photography, particularly in relation to its subject (the photographer,                           
and by extension the viewer). What Deleuze (1989: xi) says of the ‘time­image’, though in                             
the context of cinema, can be extrapolated to this context as well. 
[T]he body is no longer exactly what moves; subject of movement or the instrument of action,                               
it becomes rather the developer [revelateur] of time, it shows time through its tirednesses and                             
waitings. 
Kurdi is dead and his body is motionless, still. Well, for that matter, nothing in a photograph                                 
ever moves. But, my point of contention is that Kurdi, or better still the ‘migrant’, as the                                 
‘object’ is not ‘the instrument of action’ here. In other words, the photograph does not unfold                               
around its ‘object’. Implicit in the way Kurdi’s body is shown lying on the shore is an                                 
indication of the temporal duration ­­ what Deleuze would call ‘tirednesses and waitings’,                         
rather than the ‘decisive moment’ ­­ of the event. Upon seeing the image, I know it is not the                                     
‘flash’ or the ​fleetingness​ of time​ that arrests my attention. The camera here is witness to an                                  
event that was as if ‘tired and waiting’. So, when the ‘punctum’ of the image ‘rises from the                                   
scene, shoots out of it like an arrow, and pierces me’ (Barthes, 1981: 26), I tend to think that                                     
the event might have unfolded before me .   8
 
I do not see the image through the photographer’s eye any longer. This removal of the                               
intermediary subject (S1) ­­ the camera or the photographer ­­ provokes me as a ‘subject’                             
6 The tendency to impose a ‘national’ attribute to photography seems to be very recent. Right from the onset,                                     
classical semiotic assumptions on photography, unlike in the case of painting and cinema, have been based on                                 
its ecumenical language. This ‘universal language’ of photography, as Allan Sekula (1981) prefers to call it,                               
deems an image to be decodable and comprehensible across trans­national audience, despite all cultural                           
differences. However, recent historiography of photography often seeks to understand the medium as well as the                               
oeuvre of certain photographers in ‘national’ terms. Entries on ‘national’ photography in ​The Oxford                           
Companion to the Photograph (2005) or titles like ​American Photography​ in the Oxford History of Art series                                 
bear testimony to this.  
 
7 The subject­object distinction in the case of photography, or for that matter, visual arts in general can often be                                       
confusing. The ‘subject’ may refer to one who conceives the image (the photographer, the painter etc.). It may                                   
also refer to the referent of the image (that what the image concerns) in terms of the compositional aspect of the                                         
frame. On the other hand, the ‘object’ may refer to what has been captured in the frame, what/who we study in                                         
the frame. Thinking in these terms, one can perceive the referent of an image in its duality: it can be both                                         
‘subject’ and ‘object’ at the same time. However, in this paper, I use ‘object’ in the latter sense, while my use of                                           
‘subject’ has two dimensions: S1 refers to the photographer and S2 refers to the viewers who view and study an                                       
image. 
 
8 ​According to Roland Barthes (1981: 42), ‘punctum’ by ‘its mere presence changes my reading, that I am                                   
looking at a new photograph, marked in my eyes with a higher value’. It is that element in a photograph which                                         
appeals to the individual as a viewer. 
4 
(S2) to engage ​directly​ with the ‘object’ of the image. The image bridges a relationship                             
between S2 and the ‘object’. According to Susan Sontag (1977: 18),  
photographs alter and enlarge our notions of what is worth looking at and what we have a                                 
right to observe. They are a grammar and, even more importantly, an ethics of seeing.  
Along the same line, Urry (2002: 129) maintains that ‘[t]he objects and technologies of                           
cameras and films have constituted… what images and memories should be brought back’. In                           
other words, the medium or the intermediaries (S1) often decide for the viewers (S2) what to                               
see and how to see, thereby reinforcing a hierarchy between the two levels of subjects.                             
Conversely, in the case of Kurdi’s image, as a viewer I attain the rite of passage. I no longer                                     
need to be led by the hand; I can now indeed engage directly with the ‘object’ myself.  
 
It is only when S1 stops initiating me ​to see​ that I start ​see­ing.​ Here, I want to make a                                       
distinction between ​to see​ and ​see­ing.​ Even though the blind person’s eye does not respond                             
to the ‘external’ oculo­sensory stimulus, it does perceive ​sight​ (Derrida, 1993; Ray, 2014)​. ​To                           
see​ is all about the optometry, the neural­sensory­motor responses in the optical nerves, while                           
the act of ​see­ing​ is preconditioned upon the existence of and engagement from a (human)                             
subject. For that matter, the dead person’s eyes might be able to see, the camera lenses indeed                                 
see; but what I call ‘ocular self’ is the prerequisite for the ​perception​ of sight (Ray, 2014)​.                                 
See­ing therefore involves us ‘​to enter a universe of beings that display themselves, and… to                             
look at an object is to inhabit it’ Merleau­Ponty (1962: 68). It is this relationality that makes                                 
an image worth engaging with. It is, in ​Nancy’s (2000: 68) words, ​the ‘simultaneity of                             
being­with’, in this case the ‘object’ of the image, that makes certain larger ethos palpable to                               
the onlooker. Nancy (2000) asserts that we perceive ourselves as individuals only in relation                           
to, when in dialogue with, not necessarily in contrast to, others. Thinking in these terms, for                               
Nancy (2000: 32), being by default means ‘being­with’: ‘the singularity of each being is                           
indissociable from its being­with­many… because, in general, a singularity is indissociable                     
from a plurality’. It is this being­with­ness that, I argue, characterizes the iconicity of Kurdi’s                             
image.  
 
The intermediary subject (S1) functions as an insulator, which keeps me (S2) from directly                           
engaging with, in Ponty’s words, ‘inhabiting’ the ‘object’. It constantly reminds me of the                           
pictoriality of the ​re­presented​ , and therefore, of the uninhabitability of the object in                         
re­presentation​ . In getting rid of the S1, Kurdi’s image, on the other hand, serves a                             
contrasting mnemonic function: it haunts our memory, it disturbs our conscience so much so                           
that we can no longer choose not to ‘inhabit’ the larger ethos of the refugee crisis and the                                   
‘foreigner’ question, otherwise disavowed. It immediately unfolds before us narratives                   
concerning a ​highly contingent process of political partisanship, struggles over the meaning                       
of nationhood and citizenship, and issues of ​territorialization. While ​public discourses                     
concerning the migrant continue to invoke fear and anxiety, while the dialectic of the familiar                             
and the foreign continue to define our understanding and organization of the ‘space’ we                           
inhabit, one can r​eiterate David ​Simpson (2013: 3) in saying: the ramifications of the image 
are legal, ethical, and indeed comprehensively human: who is welcomed and who is turned                           
5 
away? Who is a friend and who is an enemy?Who deserves the protection of the law and who                                     
is outside it? At what point does the working norm give way to the exception, and who gets to                                     
decide? 
This ‘emancipatory potential’ ­­ that no longer limits my role as a spectator to merely witness                               
the indexicality of the image, but gestures towards an inherent (self­)reflexivity ­­ helps me                           
forge an unique relation with the image as well as with its ‘object’. Because of this                               
emancipation, I cease to view this image in its singularity; I rather perceive the image as what                                 
Heidegger calls ‘world picture’ . 9
 
The spectator, for Ranciere (2010), is a paradoxical figure: the spectator is ignorant, docile                           
and passive; and yet, no spectacle is complete without it having been viewed. Similarly, an                             
image is an ​image​ only when viewed. The ‘ignorant’ spectator does not have the ‘authentic’                             
knowledge to interpret the spectacle; all she does is: 
to venture into the forest of things and signs, to say what they have seen and what they think                                     
of what they have seen, to verify it and have it verified (Ranciere, 2010: 12).  
Thinking in these terms, Alan Kurdi’s image redeems our spectatorship. In illustrating how to                           
‘inhabit’ what is being seen, it actually redeems us from ignorance. Now, we know how to                               
interpret the ‘event’. As unfolds before us in its totality, we acquire this ‘​flash of knowledge’                               
with respect to the temporality of images : that the singularity of the self is immersed in the                                 10
plurality ​of the mass of the ‘they’, and, as ​Nancy (2000: 32) contends, ‘​indissociable from its                               
being­with­many’.  
 
The extent of virality of the image is reflective of how ‘​new’ media recycles contents from                               
the ‘traditional’ media, in this case, photography, which reconfigures our visual register                       
through successive ‘re­purposings’. When I share an image on the social media, I want to                             
convey something buffer to what the image in its singularity conveys. In other words, there is                               
a ‘purpose’ to why I share what I share, and where I share, why I immerse a singular image in                                       
the totality of what is out there on display. Botler and Grusin (1999) call this ‘remediation’.                               
The politics of ‘remediation’ immanent in the virality of Kurdi’s image perhaps points to how                             
we, as the emancipated spectators, meaningfully conflate the singularity of the image with its                           
plurality. Singularities, in this case, become the 
turning points and points of inflection; bottlenecks, knots, foyers, and centers; points of                         
fusion, condensation, and boiling; points of tears and joy, sickness and health, hope and                           
anxiety, “sensitive” points (Deleuze, 1990: 52).  
The concept of ​‘remediation’ thus pervades the trajectory and ‘afterlife’ of Kurdi’s image and                           
suchlike, and in so doing, brings out our indeterminable, imprecise opinion on the                         
9 The ‘world picture’, for Heidegger (1977: 115­54), offers us a phenomenological experience of the world,                               






phenomenon of migration itself, the many vicissitudes of our ‘aporetic’ take on the migrant.                           
This is the larger ‘truth’ that comes out from the image. 
Let me explain this with an anecdote. Allow me to take a detour at this point and the example                                     
of another image. In 2013, an image went viral on the social media. It was not as viral as                                     
Kurdi’s though. Naturally, it was not as iconic as Kurdi’s either. But the reason I invoke it                                 
here is that it shows with utmost clarity how vulnerable our opinion is when it comes to the                                   
migrant. The image was accompanied by a text that reads: 
Pastor Jeremiah Steepek transformed himself into a homeless person and went to the 10,000                           
member church that he was to be introduced as the head pastor at that morning. He walked                                 
around his soon to be church for 30 minutes while it was filling with people for service....only                                 
3 people out of the 7­10,000 people said hello to him. He asked people for change to buy                                   
food... NO ONE in the church gave him change. He went into the sanctuary to sit down in the                                     
front of the church and was asked by the ushers if he would please sit in the back. He greeted                                       
people to be greeted back with stares and dirty looks, with people looking down on him and                                 
judging him (‘Pastor Present’; Online). 
However, it has been exposed over the internet the story is fake. More to it, the photograph                                 
was also tailored to appear as the pastor­turned­vagabond, and was in fact of an unidentified                             
homeless person who had no connection with the story whatsoever . It is one of those several                               11
captivating tales that are better told than enacted.  
I ask the readers to note the narrative structure here. With a photograph of and a name for the                                     
pastor, and even seemingly ‘realistic’ figures, the story is written from a third person point of                               
view in a journalistic style. It is pretty obvious that the narrative style has been maneuvered                               
in order to trick the reader into believing it to be true. Anyway, the story unfolded with the                                   
homeless man discretely sitting in the back row of the church till he was introduced as the                                 
new pastor. He then walks up to the altar and recites excerpts from the biblical parable of                                 
‘The Sheep and The Goats’ from the Book of Matthew for the audience, among which ‘many                               
began to cry and many heads were bowed in shame’ (online). As evident from the symbolism                               
here, the parable is meant to teach the audience in the church, and by extension the readers of                                   
the story, about the Christian value of compassion to strangers and poor. 
I am not interested in the story per se or its (in)authencity, but rather concerned with the                                 
ambivalence that the figure of the homeless migrant invokes. The narrative cuts across the                           
central problematic concerning a fundamental enunciative paradox: the character (migrant)                   
that is marginalized in real life is romanticized as the messianic Other when it comes to                               
representation. What does this reflect of the relation between the two migrants: the real and                             
the represented? How does this bear upon the friction between our fragmentary selves: our                           
more impulsive present selves that cannot tolerate the migrant (purportedly) living off the                         




humanist values? In other words, how do the many vicissitudes and contradictions in our                           
fragmentary selves, which is to say, the deeper implication of the simultaneity in our                           
unwavering, but inharmonic, faiths in both Malthusian instrumentalism and (radical)                   
humanist values, constitute our imagination of the ‘migrant’, making the figure latent with                         
multiple meanings and disjunctive possibilities? 
This bitter contradiction underscores the ‘affect’ in Kurdi’s image. ​Heidegger’s (1977: 3)                       
prophetic formulation on technology ­­ ‘[t]he essence of technology is by no means                         
technological’ ­­ can perhaps be transposed in the context of Kurdi’s image: the essence of                             
this photograph seems to be by no means photographic. ​Rather, the heart of the image                             
concerns, beyond the referent (refugee crisis), its representation (Kurdi’s image) or its                       
referentiality, the ‘promiscuous entanglement’ ­­ to borrow Rita Felski’s (1995) phrase ­­                       
between our Malthusian selves and our rectitudinous selves .  12
Alan Kurdi lay dead on the shore, at the interstitial space where the sea meets the land. Can                                   
we read this intesticiality as an allegory of the frontier between our dichotomous selves? As                             
we are torn between contradictions, yet click the ‘share’ button on Kurdi’s image over social                             



















12 On the one hand, the image, within hours of going viral, boosted donations to charities for the migrants. The                                       
Migrant Offshore Aid Station, for example, recorded a 15­fold increase in donations. (https://goo.gl/QzWDC6).                         
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